We present three modal logics for the spi-calculus and show that they capture strong versions of the environment sensitive bisimulation introduced by Boreale et al. Our logics differ from conventional modal logics for process calculi in that they allow us to describe the knowledge of an attacker directly.
Introduction
In recent years the study of correctness issues of security protocols has become an important research topic. Following Dolev and Yao [5] , a basic assumption is that all communication of a protocol may be visible to the hostile environment and that this hostile environment is capable of interfering with the protocol by altering or blocking any message and by creating new messages. Moreover, these are the only kinds of attacks -an attacker cannot exploit weaknesses of the encryption algorithm itself (the 'perfect encryption hypothesis').
In the Dolev-Yao setting, an important approach to reasoning about properties of security protocols is to use modal logics, an important example of which is the logic of authentication introduced by Burrows et al. in [1] .
Another promising approach in the Dolev-Yao setting is that of using process calculi. A recent such calculus is the spi calculus of Abadi and Gordon [3] , a dialect of the π-calculus [9] . In the spi calculus security protocols are described as process terms and the correctness relation is captured by a notion of behavioural equivalence [8] . Abadi and Gordon proposed may-testing equivalence as their choice of equivalence. However, may-testing equivalence does not allow for a simple proof technique. As a result, both Abadi and Gordon [2] and Boreale et al. [4] have introduced modified notions of bisimulation equivalence which capture both the interaction with and the knowledge of the environment.
In this paper we relate the two strands of research by presenting three modal logics for the environment-sensitive semantics of the spi calculus introduced by Boreale, De Nicola and Pugliese [4] . Our main result is that these logics capture strong versions of the environment sensitive bisimulations of [4] in both their late and early versions. In this way, our work can be viewed as extending the results on logics for the π-calculus [10] . An important consequence of our results is that nonbisimilar processes can be distinguished by our logics. If P in environment σ P and Q in environment σ Q are inequivalent, then there is some property φ satisfied by one process but not by the other in their respective environments.
Our modal logics are environment-sensitive; they provide us with the ability to describe both the knowledge of an attacker and the behaviour of a protocol. The logics are all based on a common sublogic Φ from which we shall construct the logics F, EM and LM. We consider a version of the spi calculus without pairs; the generalization to the full calculus is straightforward.
In [6] Durgin, Pavlovic and Mitchell have introduced a modal logic for a process calculus based on ideas from strand spaces and the spi calculus. An important difference between our work and theirs is our explicit aim is to determine logics that correspond to the equivalence-based notion of correct in the spi calculus.
The spi calculus: Syntax
We shall consider a spi calculus which is a subset of the original calculus of [3] in that we omit numbers and pairs. Unlike [3, 4] , where encryption is a message term constructor while decryption is a process construct, both are part of our message term language.
The syntactic categories of the spi calculus are: an infinite set of names, a, b, k . . . ∈ N , an infinite set of variables, u, v, . . . ∈ V, a set of expressions L, M, N, . . . ∈ L, a set of guards, G . . . ∈ G, and a set of agents, A, B, . . . ∈ Ag.
Messages are defined as follows:
kn successively encrypted under n keys k 1 , . . . , k n will be denoted by the shorthand {M } Ẽ k . The set of messages, M, are the expressions of L that only consist of names and encryptions. They have the syntax
Guards have the structure
Finally, agents are defined by
In an agent (ν a)A, the name a is bound in A and in the agent L(u).A, the variable u is bound in A. The sets of free names, fn(A), bound names, bn(A), names, n(A), free variables, fv(A), and bound variables, bv(A), of an agent A are defined as expected. A{M/u} denotes the agent obtained by replacing every free occurrence of u in A by M , renaming bound names as necessary. We identify agents up to α-conversion of bound names and variables. If agents A 1 and A 2 can be identified in this way, we write A 1 ≡ α A 2 . A process is an agent that does not contain any free variables; Pr denotes the set of all processes. The set of processes is ranged over by P , Q, and R.
Environments
An environment records the knowledge of an observer/attacker. Following [4] , an environment is a function σ : Z → M, where Z is a set of environment variables such that Z ∩ V = ∅. We write {M 1 /x 1 , M 2 /x 2 , . . . , M n /x n } for the environment σ defined by σx i = M i for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. σ[x → M ] denotes the environment that maps x to M and any other environment variable y to σy.
Environment messages
The messages that an environment σ can send to a process are evaluated environment messages.
The set of environment messages, Υ, is given by the following grammar.
The set of environment variables in an environment message ζ is denoted fz(ζ).
We evaluate environment messages using the function e : L → M ∪ {⊥}, defined in section Table 1 and let ⊥ represent the value of any message that cannot be evaluated. Typically, such messages involve a decryption operation that cannot be performed.
The knowledge of an environment
Our semantics of the spi calculus is environmentsensitive; it depends on the information that can be deduced from the environment. We employ the characterization of the knowledge of an environment presented in [4, 11] . The analysis of a set of messages W is the set of messages that can be deduced from W by decryption.
Definition 1
The analysis of a set W ⊆ M, written A(W ), is the smallest set satisfying
The knowledge of a set of messages W is the set of names of the analysis of W .
Definition 2
The knowledge of a set W ⊆ M,
For an environment σ we will use the shorthand notations A(σ) and K(σ) for A(range(σ)) and K(range(σ)). Given a set of messages W , we denote by core(W, M ) what is left of the message M when it is decrypted as much as possible with respect to the knowledge of W .
Definition 3
Let W ⊆ M. The core of the message M ∈ M with respect to W , written core(W, M ), is defined by
For an environment σ and a message M we will use the shorthand notation core(σ, M ) for core(range(σ), M ).
Equivalence of environments
Following [4] , two environments are equivalent if they have the same decryption power. IfÑ i is a tuple of messages where i ∈ I and J ⊆ I, we writeÑ [J] for the tuple {N i | i ∈ J}.
Definition 4 Let σ and σ be environments where
and
). σ and σ are equivalent, written σ ∼ e σ , if for each i ∈ I the following holds, 
The spi calculus: Semantics
We here present the environment sensitive semantics introduced in [4] and our notion of bisimilarity. The semantics has two levels.
Processes
At the process level transitions have the form A α −→ A , where α is given by the grammar
The semantics of processes is given by the labelled transition system (Ag, Act, −→), where −→ is the smallest relation closed under the rules in table 3. The symmetric rules for Sum, Par, and Com have been omitted. 
Environment sensitive semantics
At the environment sensitive level of our semantics, configurations consist of a process together with an environment.
Definition 5
The set of configurations, Γ, is defined as
The environment sensitive semantics is given by the labelled transition system (Γ, Act e , −→), where −→ is the smallest relation closed under the rules in table 4. Transitions have the form σ P α −→ δ σ P and represent interactions between the process P and the environment σ. α is the process action and δ is the complementary environment action. The set of environment actions, Act e , is defined by the grammar
Environment sensitive bisimulation
Environment sensitive bisimilarity, introduced in [4] relates configurations of environment sensitive semantics. Unlike [4] , we consider strong equivalences. First, we define a strong early environment sensitive bisimilarity where the matching of a transition may depend on the message sent by the environment.
Definition 7 The configurations σ P P and σ Q Q are strong early environment sensitive [E-Tau] bisimilar, written σ P P ∼ EESB σ Q Q, if there exists a strong early environment sensitive bisimulation R such that (σ P P, σ Q Q) ∈ R.
Alternatively, we could define a late version of environment sensitive bisimilarity where the matching of a transition is independent of the message sent by the environment. Here we capture the late instantiation by means of the late semantics at the process level.
(ii) if α = a(u) and a ∈ A(σ P ) then there exists Q such that Q a(u) −→ Q and for all ζ ∈ Υ, where e(ζσ P ) =⊥ and n(ζ) ∩ fn(P, Q, σ
Definition 9
The configurations σ P P and σ Q Q are strong late environment sensitive bisimilar, written σ P P ∼ ESB σ Q Q, if there exists a strong late environment sensitive bisimulation R such that (σ P P, σ Q Q) ∈ R.
Logical formulae
The logics that we shall present all contain the usual propositional connectives and have two kinds of formulae. Common to all three logics is the set of environment formulae, ranged over by φ σ . These are atomic formulae that describe the contents of an environment.
The logics differ from each other with respect to their process formulae, ranged over by φ P . These are modal formulae that describe the behaviour of a process. More precisely, the difference lies in the input modalities which correspond to the matching conditions for early, resp. late bisimulation.
Any formula may contain formula messages from the set Ω, ranged over by η.
Logical formulae: Syntax
The syntax of formulae and formula messages is:
where I is an index set which may be infinite. We sometimes use additional propositional connectives, letting φ 1 ∨ φ 2 and tt stand for ¬(¬φ 1 ∧ ¬φ 2 ) and i∈∅ φ i , respectively.
Environment formulae φ σ let us express the contents of an environment. Firstly, we can express whether messages of the environment can be completely decrypted with the keysk from the knowledge of the environment (
). This aspect of our logic resembles the construct P sees X in the belief logic of [1] . If a variable x is instantiated to a name b, the set of keysk is empty and we use the shorthand x → b.
Secondly, as we aim to be able to express environments up to equivalence we need to be able to express that exactly n environment variables are bound by an environment (# = n) and whether the core of a message is a name (core(x) : N ).
Process formulae φ P describe the behaviour of a process by means of the Hennessy-Milner-style modalities used in modal logics for the π-calculus [10] . In both the early input modality, a(u) E φ, and the late input modality a(u) L φ, u is bound in φ. However, their semantics differ so as to correspond to the matching conditions of early and late bisimilarity. In the former modality, u is instantiated in φ whereas u is the subject of a universal quantification over possible input terms in the latter.
The syntactic conventions are standard. The sets of free variables, fv(φ), and bound variables, bv(φ), of a formula are defined as expected. We write φ{η/u} for the formula obtained be replacing every free occurrence of u in φ by η, renaming bound variables as necessary, and identify formulae up to renaming of bound variables. The logic Φ consists of closed formulae, Φ = {φ | fv(φ) = ∅}. The following example illustrates how to express a security property in the proposed modal logic.
]. Process P can emit a secret key, k 3 , encrypted with itself on the channel b to the environment σ P . This can be described by the formula
Notice the modality of the latter conjunct.
Logical formulae: Semantics
The satisfaction relation between configurations and all formulae of Φ apart from the late modality a(u) L φis given in Table 5 . The late input modality a(u) L φ will be handled separately in section 6.2, as the semantics involves a universal quantification over a suitable set of names. Section 6.2 describes how these names must be chosen.
The function T (σ, ζ) substitutes each name a in ζ to the environment variable x in σ that maps to a (T will only be used in a context where σ is bijective with respect to the names in ζ, i.e. |{x ∈ dom(σ) | σ(x) = a}| = 1).
We use the shorthand notation σ φ if σ P φ for all P ∈ Pr.
A logical characterization of bisimilarity
The two notions of bisimilarity from Section 4.3 can be captured by our modal logics.
Characterization of ∼ EESB
We first present two early logics F and EM that both characterize strong early environment sensitive bisimilarity. Let Φ 0 denote the set of those formulae of Φ that neither contain the match connective [η = η]φ nor the modalites aζ φ, a(u) E φ, and a(u) L φ.
• F is Φ 0 extended with aζ φ
• EM is Φ 0 extended with [η = η]φ and a(u) E φ.
To prove that strong early environment sensitive bisimilarity can be characterized by the logics F and EM we define a logical process equivalence for each of the two logics. Here we need the following definition.
Definition 10
Let ∆ be a subset of Φ. Then
The following lemma is essential as it shows that our environment formulae allow us to characterize environments up to equivalence. Lemma 1 Let σ be an environment. Then there exists an environment formula φ σ ∈ Φ 0 such that σ φ σ and if σ Q φ σ then σ ∼ e σ .
PROOF: Assume |dom(σ)| = n. Let φ σ def = i∈I φ i be the formula whose conjuncts are defined as follows:
• # = n always occurs as a conjunct
• core(x) : N = φ i occurs for any x such that core(σ, σ(x)) ∈ N By Table 5 it is easily seen that σ P φ σ for all P ∈ Pr and if σ Q φ σ then σ ∼ e σ .
We can now show that = F and ∼ EESB coincide.
PROOF: We first prove that σ P P ∼ EESB σ Q Q implies σ P P = F σ Q Q. Assume σ P P ∼ EESB σ Q Q and σ P P φ. We must show that σ Q Q φ. The proof proceeds by structural induction on φ. Next, we prove that
is a strong early environment sensitive bisimulation.
Next, we prove that = EM and ∼ EESB coincide.
Theorem 2 σ P P = EM σ Q Q if and only if σ P P ∼ EESB σ Q Q.
PROOF: We will first prove that σ P P ∼ EESB σ Q Q implies σ P P = EM σ Q Q. Assume σ P P ∼ EESB σ Q Q and σ P P φ. We must show that σ Q Q φ. The proof is σ P ¬φ if σ P φ σ P i∈I φ i if σ P φ i for all i ∈ I σ P τ φ if there exists P such that σ P τ −→ − σ P and σ P φ σ P aζ φ if there existb, u, σ , and P such that σ P a(u) −→ (νb)āζ σ P and σ P φ σ P a(u) E φ if for all ζ ∈ Υ with n(ζ) ∩ fn(P, σ) = ∅ and e(ζσ) =⊥ there existb, σ , and P such that σ P a(u) −→ (νb)āζ σ P and σ P φ{T (σ , ζ)/u} σ P ā φ if there existb, M, x, σ , and P such that by structural induction on φ. Next, we prove that σ P P = EM σ Q Q implies σ P P ∼ EESB σ Q Q. This follows from theorem 1 and the fact that σ P P aζ φ if and only if
Characterization of ∼ ESB
We now present the logic LM and show that it can be used to characterize strong late environment sensitive bisimilarity. It is somewhat involved to prove this result using the technique of the proofs of theorems 1 and 2 if we employ Definition 8 as is. In clause (ii) of the definition we must quantify over the infinitely many input messages ζ ∈ Υ, where e(ζσ 1 ) =⊥ and n(ζ)∩fn(P, Q, σ 1 , σ 2 ) = ∅. Thus, the names in an input message ζ must be chosen with respect to both P and Q.
This leads us to define the auxiliary notion of Senvironment sensitive bisimulation where S ⊆ N represents the set of names that input terms may contain. We show that S-environment sensitive bisimilarity may be used to characterize strong late environment sensitive bisimilarity for a suitably chosen S and subsequently prove that LM can be used to characterize S-environment sensitive bisimilarity using the same technique as in the proofs of theorems 1 and 2.
The logic LM
In the late logic LM the late input modality is the only modality for input transitions.
S-environment sensitive bisimulation
Definition 11 (S-Environment Sensitive Bisimulation)
(ii) if α = a(u) and a ∈ A(σ P ) then there ex-
−→ Q and for all ζ ∈ Υ, where e(ζσ P ) =⊥ and n(ζ)
andc ∩ fn(P, σ P ) = ∅ then there existd, N , and Q such that Q
Definition 12
The configurations σ P P and σ Q Q are S-environment sensitive bisimilar, written σ P P ∼ S ESB σ Q Q, if there exists an S-environment sensitive bisimulation R such that (σ P P, σ Q Q) ∈ R.
Generally, ∼ S ESB and ∼ ESB do not coincide.
However, if two configurations are strong late environment sensitive bisimilar then they are also Senvironment sensitive bisimilar for some infinite set S containing the free names of the two configurations. To show this we need the following three lemmas.
Lemma 2 If
• if α = a(u) then fn(P ) ∪ {a} ⊆ fn(P ).
• if α = (νc)āM then fn(P ) ∪ {a} ∪ n(M ) ⊆ fn(P ) ∪c.
Lemma 3 Let σ N be an injective name substitu-
Lemma 4 Let σ P P ∼ ESB σ Q Q and let σ N be the injective name substitution defined by
Theorem 3 Let S ⊆ N be an infinite set. If σ P P ∼ ESB σ Q Q and fn(P, Q, σ P , σ Q ) ⊆ S, then
} is an Senvironment sensitive bisimulation. That transitions can be matched follows from Lemmas 2,3 and 4
If two configurations are S-environment sensitive bisimilar for some infinite and co-infinite set S ⊆ N containing the free names of the two configurations then they are also strong late environment sensitive bisimilar.
Theorem 4
Let S ⊆ N and σ P P, σ Q Q ∈ Γ such that fn(P, Q, σ P , σ Q ) ⊆ S, σ P P ∼ S ESB σ Q Q, and S and N \ S are both infinite. Then
} is a strong late environment sensitive bisimulation.
Characterization of ∼ S ESB and ∼ ESB
We now characterize ∼ S ESB and consequently also ∼ ESB by the logic LM. To do this, we introduce a S-satisfaction relation between configurations and formulae of LM as given in Table 6 . Here, the quantification over names for the late input modality must be found among S.
Next, we define a logical process equivalence for our logic with respect to an S ⊆ N .
Definition 13
Let ∆ be a subset of LM and let
PROOF: We will first prove that
Assume σ P P ∼ S ESB σ Q Q and σ P P S φ. We must show that σ Q Q S φ. The proof will be by structural induction on φ. Finally, we prove that
We do this by showing that the relation R defined by
is an S-environment sensitive bisimulation.
We therefore have that strong late environment sensitive bisimilarity can be characterized by the logic LM.
An application
In this section we describe a simplified, flawed version of the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol where the session key is revealed by the server. This flawed protocol should not be equivalent to the correct protocol. We demonstrate this by presenting a distinguishing modal formula.
In the correct version of the Wide-Mouthed Frog protocol the principals A and B share the keys k AS and k BS , respectively, with a server S. Before A sends a secret message M to B, it first creates a new key, k AB , and sends it to the server encrypted with the key k AS . The server then decrypts M and sends k AB to B encrypted with key k BS . Now, A can send its secret message M to B encrypted with the key k AB . This protocol can be expressed in the spi calculus as follows.
Here F (M ) is an agent representing the behaviour of B upon reception of M .
The flawed protocol, where S accidentally reveals the session key, can be expressed as follows.
The two configurations σ P (a) and σ P (a), where σ def = {c AS /x 1 , c AB /x 2 , c SB /x 3 }, are not strong early environment sensitive bisimilar; the correct version will never, in the course of its 3 steps, allow the environment to obtain knowledge of any ciphertext {a} Ẽ k . This can be expressed by the following distinguishing formula:
σ P S ¬φ if σ P S φ σ P S i∈I φ i if σ P S φ i for all i ∈ I σ P S τ φ if there exists P such that P τ −→ P and σ P S φ σ P S a(u) L φ if a ∈ A(σ) and there exists P such that P a(u)
−→ P and for all ζ ∈ Υ with n(ζ) ∩ (S ∪ K(σ)) = ∅ and e(ζσ) =⊥ , σ[z → n(ζ)] P {e(ζσ)/u} S φ{T (σ[z → n(ζ)], ζ)/u} σ P S ā φ if a ∈ A(σ) and there existb, M, x, and P such that , core(σ, σ(x)) / ∈ N , and k ⊆ K(σ) σ P S core(x) = core(z) if core(σ, σ(x)) = core(σ, σ(z)) 
Conclusions and further work
We have presented three modal logics which characterize early and late versions of the environment sensitive bisimilarity of [4] . The logics allow us to describe properties of the behaviour of a process via the use of Hennessy-Milner-style modalities and the knowledge of the environment using atomic formulae describing the bindings of an environment.
To overcome the obstacles of the definition of late bisimilarity we introduced the notion of Senvironment sensitive bisimilarity where S is any set of names and a corresponding interpretation of the modal logic considered.
Although our modal logics characterize versions of environment sensitive bisimilarity they suffer from the fact we need infinite conjunction to describe an unbounded number of protocol runs. To overcome this, one can extend the logic with a fixed-point operator, obtaining a µ-calculus [7, 13] .
As our results show inequivalent configurations can be distinguished by a formula in the appropriate logic. Another direction for further work is therefore to devise an algorithm for finding the simplest such distinguishing formula.
The equivalences studied in this paper are all strong. An obvious next step is therefore to devise logics that correspond to the weak, τ -abstracting notions of environment-sensitive bisimilarity [4] . We expect this extension to be straightforward.
